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Summary. - The paper shows that in a comparison between supermarket channels (working via dedicated 
wholesalers) and traditional channels, farmers selling to supermarkets tend to be in the upper-end of the “small 
farmer” category (whereas the traditional-channel growers are in the smaller end), have more capital (in 
particular, irrigation, which allows them to supply all year and attain greater productivity and consistency), and 
be much more specialized in commercial horticulture in general and in tomatoes in particular, as compared to 
the traditional farmers. While they have higher yields, they also have higher input use, including use of 
chemicals, and these greater input expenditures (accompanied by more credit and technical assistance from the 
chemical companies) means that their profit rate is roughly similar to the farmers in the traditional channel. 
They tell us that they prefer still the more demanding wholesale-supermarket channel because it offers a lower 
risk and lower transaction cost outlet for the variety of their qualities and grades, all year. In turn, the 
supermarkets, who do not buy direct but rather source from a few dedicated wholesalers, rely on this year-round 
supply, lower transaction costs, and consistency. While the share of supermarkets in the produce market in 
Guatemala is still minor, these results mean merely that the more capitalized-tier of small farmers enjoy some 
advantages with the new channel, but also some entry costs that the traditional farmers as of yet do not face. As 
the supermarket channel grows, it is expected that more and more farmers will need to capitalized in ways that 
will either make them competitive in the new market, or in the traditional markets that will doubtless evolve to 
maintain competitiveness themselves. Development programs over the medium-long run will need to take into 
account the changing nature of farm-level investments thus implied.  
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  Driven by rising incomes and urbanization, as well as foreign investment and 
procurement technology change, the share of supermarkets in food retail in Latin America rose 
from a mere 10-20% in 1990 to 50-60% by the early 2000s, displacing small shops and open-air 
markets (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002). That trend started somewhat later in Central America 
and has gone less far, reaching 20-40% (depending on the country) of food retail by the early 
2000s, and rising (Berdegué et al. 2005). Guatemala is in the middle/upper end of the income 
distribution in the sub-region; the share of supermarkets in its food retail was a mere 15% in 
1994 and had reached 35% by 2003, with a doubling in the number of stores (Orellana, 2003).   
  Such change downstream in the agrifood system can be hypothesized to be changing 
market conditions facing farmers. Generally, compared to traditional retailers, supermarkets have 
different and more demanding product and transaction requirements. However, despite the 
increasing importance of the rise of supermarkets, there has been little empirical research on the 
determinants of channel choice of farmers (between supermarket and traditional market 
channels) and the effects of those choices on net incomes and technologies.  
This paper aims at those issues, taking as a case that of tomatoes growers selling (via 
wholesalers) to the supermarket channel versus the traditional retailer market channel in 
Guatemala. This subject has not been studied in Guatemala, and has received as yet little 
research attention in developing regions, mainly due to the newness of the structural change in 
markets. Tomatoes were chosen as the focus because they are grown by small and small-medium   1
producers only, and are the main produce item in the supermarket sales and in consumption. The 
analysis is based on field interviews with supermarkets and wholesalers, and a representative 
survey of farmers. The fieldwork took place in June-August 2004. The analysis focuses on (1) 
the determinants of market channel choice, and (2) the associated changes in practices (in 
particular technologies) and net incomes. 
   
2. Context  
 
Traditional retailing of food in Guatemala, as traditionally everywhere in the world, was 
and is composed of small shops, wetmarkets and other public markets, and street vendors. Into 
this setting came supermarkets, at first only as a tiny niche for upper income groups in the capital 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, between the mid 1990s and now, supermarket sector 
growth “took off” under the impetus mainly of domestic capital investments, only lately in 
foreign joint ventures. Today there are three supermarket chains (with 137 stores) and 30 
independent supermarkets. One of the chains, La Fragua (with brands such as Paiz) has about 
70% of the sector, so it is quite concentrated by international standards. Supermarkets have 
spread from the capital city to secondary then tertiary cities and towns over the past decade, and 
from high to middle to lower income segments, changing and adapting store formats and product 
offerings as they went.  
As the supermarket sector grew, it went from having a very tiny offering of fruits and 
vegetables, to having some tenth of its food sales in these. As the volumes grew, the leading 
chain (La Fragua) in particular has modernized its procurement system to reduce costs (product 
and coordination costs) and increase quality and consistency. The leading chain has been   2
gradually moving away from the traditional procurement system, practiced earlier than a half 
decade ago by all retailers, and today still practiced by the secondary chains and independent 
supermarkets as well as the traditional wholesalers, of sourcing from brokers in the traditional 
wholesale markets, in spot market relations. 
 The general story of this procurement modernization is told in Berdegué et al. (2005) and 
can be summarized as a general and gradual shift, in particular over the past several years, 
toward centralization of buying in distribution centers (away from store by store procurement), 
toward the use of just a few specialized/dedicated wholesalers per product rubric, a gradual shift 
in several categories toward direct purchase from producers, and the introduction of private 
standards of quality. This description of system change is the “average”, the center of gravity – 
while the coverage and speed of this procurement change varied greatly over types of products.  
The traditional marketing channel of tomatoes is still as it has been for decades (Fletcher 
et al., 1970): tomatoes are grown in several zones, are bought in the field from the farmers by 
many small brokers, to zone level larger brokers, to traditional wholesalers based in the 
wholesale markets buy from the field brokers, and then sell in the traditional wholesale markets 
to the retailers.  
The lead supermarket chains also still buy from the wholesale market, as in years past, 
but the difference is that in the past several years they have shifted from buying from many 
brokers and wholesalers to entering a relatively stable relationship with just a few specialized 
wholesalers that are partly “dedicated” to them, buying the commercial grade quality they 
require, sorting and selecting and boxing and delivering to the chain’s distribution center, as well 
as selling to other markets. The lead chain told us that they shifted from the old system of 
sourcing from many smaller brokers to using several dedicated wholesalers in order to: (1) assure   3
quality and consistency of delivery of product year round (as the dedicated wholesalers have a 
large network of brokers and agents spread over several agroecological zones, given that it does 
not pay to have greenhouse production for the local market of these commodity products); (2) 
have a “one-stop shop” where they can source several types of produce at once, and thus reduce 
the risk they will be long on tomatoes but short on carrots, say; (3) deal with few intermediaries, 
reducing coordination costs by dealing with five rather than fifty or a hundred brokers.  
While below we explore statistically the inter-household determinants of farmers selling 
to the traditional versus the supermarket channel, and thus the characteristics of the farmers in 
the two channels, we also asked qualitative questions of a subset of farmers, of those selling to 
the supermarkets, why they are in that channel. For them this question was equivalent to “why do 
you sell to the handful of large wholesalers that sell to the supermarkets inter alia?” They noted 
that selling to the large wholesalers who sell both the first-grade to the supermarkets and the 
seconds to other markets, means that they have a “one-stop shop” for selling their produce, and 
reduces the risk of being left with a certain grade but no ready buyer. But why do they prefer to 
sell to the wholesalers rather than directly to the supermarkets, perhaps thereby getting a better 
price? They noted that supermarkets pay with a delay of several weeks, while the wholesalers 
pay “cash on the barrel”, and that the wholesalers sweeten the relationship by throwing in credit 
(thus resolving an idiosyncratic credit market access constraint faced by the farmers. This 
amounts to tied product-credit markets of the type described in the “market linkages” literature 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985) and the recent literature on addressing of idiosyncratic market 
failures by private sector actors such as processing firms buying from farmers (Gow and 
Swinnen, 2001).    4
3. Model and Data  
3.1. General  Analytical Approach 
Our general analytical approach is as follows. First, we model market-channel 
“adoption,” drawing from the behavioral function used in technology adoption; as market-
channel is essentially a (post-harvest) technology decision, this is appropriate.  Feder et al. 
(1985) found that this decision process can be modeled as a standard static adoption decision, 
and it is determined by the incentives and capacities of the farmer. The general form of adoption 
functions is similar to that of input demand functions such as those derived from profit functions 
(without requiring the assumption of profit maximization, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995): 
adoption of the channel or the input is a function of relative prices of outputs and inputs, risk, 
and a vector of quasi-fixed capital assets, as well as various context-specific shifters.  
Second, we determine the effect of the channel adoption on the choice of technology by 
comparing the production functions of producers who sell to the adopted channel (supermarket) 
versus producers who sell to the traditional channels. We use the term “effect” with caution 
because our data do not allow us to determine the direction of causality, as they are cross-section. 
Our qualitative interviews lead us to believe that the decision process is indeed two-stage, with 
farmers deciding market channel and then making appropriate investments, but that assumption 
is not critical to our empirical analysis.    5
3.2. Implementation Model 
Market Channel Adoption Determinants  
We use a probit model for the regression determining market channel choice, between the 
supermarket channel (the leading two chains with about 80% of the supermarket sector) versus 
the traditional channel. The probit model is 
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This model measures the producers’ access probability to the supermarket channel taking into 
consideration the producer’s characteristics: 
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Where: 
i    represents the producer (i = 1, …, 164);  
y   represents the  market channel to which the producer sells to, where y=0 for the 
producers who sell to the traditional channel, and y=1 for the producers who sell to the 
supermarket channel; 
P   represents the probability that a market channel will be chosen by a producer i; 
X    represents the vector of characteristics of the producers as well as their  farms, 
which includes the following variables: (1) Age of the producer, (2) education of the producer; 
(3) number of persons in the farm household; (4) access to means of transportation; (5) 
participation in farmer organization(s); (6) cattle as an asset; (7) distance from the market; (8) 
total farm size.     6
Technology Effects of Market Adoption  
To measure the technological differences among the producers who sell to different 
channels, the production functions of the two groups were estimated and compared, and those are 
estimated for one production year (with aggregation for the farm over seasons if the producer 
cropped in more than one season). We use a Cobb Douglas production function:  
(2)  
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Where:  
Y    represents the total tomato production of each producer (i = 1, …, 164); 
X  is the vector of the k production factors, as follows: 
1
1
β X  = Labor measured by wages or days worked in preparation of the tomato plots, 




β X  = Represents the total tomato planting area during the past agricultural year. 
3
3
β X = This is the total cost of the chemical solid fertilizers applied to the tomato plants, 
which represent the physical amount of the fertilizers (in kg) multiplied by their cost (price per 
kg for that producer); value was used in order to aggregate over various types of fertilizer. 
4
4
β X  = Represents the total costs of chemical foliage fertilizers 
5
5
β X = This is the total cost of applied herbicides 
6
6
β X = This is the total cost of applied fungicides 
7
7
β X = It’s the total cost of applied insecticides   7
8
8
β X = Represents the land quality variable, which is the ratio between the irrigated area 
and the total area of the farm (note that this is essentially the share of tomato land under 
irrigation as tomatoes dominate the cropped area).   
3.3. Estimation Method: Switching Regressions   
As the production function is estimated separately for each of the two strata, there is 
endogenous stratification. A usual way to address the selectivity bias and control for the 
conditional probability of a farm being in a given group is to use the two stage method of 
Heckman (1978, 1979). The procedure consists of the estimation of the production function for 
each group of producers stratified by the channel they represent. Through this process, the 
product function estimation uses the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) as a regressor and it is calculated 
from the market adoption probit model that has been presented in the section of determinants of 
the channel adoption. Hence,   
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Moreover, since this is a stratified sample by a possible endogenous variable, it was 
necessary to introduce a weighting procedure (WESML) to correct for sampling bias 
(Wooldridge, 2002), due to Manski and Lerman (1977) and for example applied in a similar 
situation by Pitt and Khandker (1998). We determined the population weights by cross checking 
information obtained from FASAGUA (Guatemalan Agricultural Associations Federation) 
concerning the number of tomato producers by production area and the information about   8




The data come from a grower survey (using a structured questionnaire that covered 
household characteristics, farm production, characteristics, and sales, and participation in 
organizations, as well access to services like credit and technical assistance) undertaken in June-
August 2004.  
A two-stage stratified random sample was undertaken of tomato growers who participate 
in the supermarket channel (as well usually as the other channel) and traditional-channel-only 
growers. The sampling from the two populations was done in stages. (1) We identified the 
production areas where traditional wholesalers and the dedicated wholesalers source tomatoes by 
asking wholesalers in what zones tomatoes are sourced and double checking that against 
information from the government statistics. All commercial production areas were considered, 
but some were left out of the sampling due to very small numbers of producers, so we focused on 
the main production zones where the wholesalers source. (2) We undertook a random sample of 
164 tomato growers in those areas.  We weighted the sampling of areas by the number of tomato 
producers in the different zones, and randomly sampled in those zones. We had prior information 
on the set of wholesalers selling to supermarkets, and by asking to which wholesalers or local 
brokers the farmers sold, we could classify the farmers. From the 164 farms sampled, 112 belong 
to the supermarket channel and 52 to the traditional channel.   
  
4. Patterns in Differences between Groups   9
 
First, despite an expectation that supermarket-channel farms would be bigger, a 
hypothesis that is heard commonly concerning whether one has to be a large farmer to access 
modernized segments of urban markets - in fact there were no significant differences in overall 
farm sizes between the groups. Of course, in that these are non-staple food farmers, and 
commercial rather than subsistence farmers, they are on average a bit larger than the average 
farm in Guatemala, as one would expect. The traditional channel farm is on average 7.8 ha, 
although that is two-thirds pasture land (non-arable land such as hillsides), with only 2.5 hectares 
of cultivable land, small indeed. The supermarket channel average farm is larger, 9.3 ha, but half 
is non-arable (just pastures) and only 4.6 ha of arable land. So from the perspective of cropping, 
these are all small farms, and not too far from the national average size farm of 4.5 hectares 
(INE, 2004). Household size is about the same for the two groups (5 persons) so the farms under 
consideration are 0.5 to 1 ha per capita, small farms.  
Moreover, the rental share (rented land is arable land, farmers do not rent pastures) is 
notably high among the supermarket channel farmers – 40% of their arable land! – with only 
20% rate for the traditional farmers. Both rates are higher than the national rate on annual and 
perennial farmlands (18.7%, see INE 2004), indicating that prime horticultural land is under high 
demand in those zones. High rental rates also appear to indicate that it is relatively expensive to 
buy land, and owners do not want to part with it.  
Finally, the crop composition data show that the supermarket channels are far more 
specialized in tomato production (91% of their cropped land) than are the traditional channel 
farmers (only 68% of their land, still a surprisingly high share, showing the horticulture focus of 
these zones). Moreover, the supermarket channel producers are much more specialized in   10
horticultural crops in the rest of their farms (outside tomatoes), as 50% of them grow other 
horticultural crops compared to only 19% of traditional producers doing so. Traditional 
producers tend to produce more basic grains than supermarket producers, since 77% of 
traditional producers grow grains compared to 61% of supermarket producers. The picture that 
emerges is that slightly larger, but much more horticulture and commercially specialized 
producers are the supermarket channel producers, compared to the traditional channel farmers.  
Technological and Yield differences  
First, the main difference in production technology between supermarket-channel and 
traditional producers is that the farms of the farmer are far more irrigated: 80% have irrigation, 
while only 35% of the traditional channel farmers have it; half of their farmland is irrigated, 
while only one-seventh of that of the traditional farmers is.  Some supermarket channel 
producers had irrigation already and some put it in after entered the channel. Our farmer survey 
asked about the farm’s irrigated area “five years ago, and now” and about when the farmer 
entered the supermarket channel. We analyzed these data and found that: (1) farmers who were 
longstanding participants in the supermarket channel (in it in 1999 or before) had 2.6 ha on 
average of irrigated area, when they started, and added 2 more ha from 1999 to 2003; (2) those 
who joined the supermarket channel recently (1999-2003) had only 0.8. ha when they started but 
added 0.7 ha since, and (3) the traditional channel producers, who had only 0.5 ha of irrigated 
land when they stared, and added a mere 0.3 ha in the past five years. All the differences are 
significant at a 10% level. Thus, the supermarket channel growers both had more irrigation to 
start and invested far more quickly in it as compared to the traditional growers. This corroborates 
the statements we heard from the dedicated wholesalers that they prefer farmers who have 
irrigation. More irrigation has two important effects: (1) better quality and consistency of the   11
product, with a higher share of commercial grade product; (2) ability to multiple-crop over a 
year, that is, have multiple “production cycles”: 74% of supermarket-channel farmers sow twice 
a year, while only 20% of the traditional channel do; the statistical correlation between double 
cropping and have irrigation is strong and significant. 
Moreover, supermarket-channel farmers have 20% better yields. That, combined with 
twice the farm land dedicated to tomatoes, and nearly twice the cropping cycles, spells 300% 
more tomato volume from an average supermarket-channel farm compared to traditional-channel 
farmers. Volume, consistency over the year in output, quality – all spell attractive characteristics 
to have these farms on the preferred supplier lists of dedicated wholesalers who need to deliver 
to supermarket chains, all year (supermarket procurement officers complained to us about the 
sharply seasonal glut of tomatoes in wholesale markets and then dearth other times), good 
quality tomatoes, and do it competitively, hence getting as much per farmer as possible to reduce 
transaction costs. The mirror image of this calculation appears to be made by the farmers who 
sell to that channel: they want the greatest payoff at least transaction cost and risk to provide a 
good return on their investment in irrigation and their technology practices providing better 
yields.  
Credit Access and Technical assistance 
First, 83% of supermarket-channel, and 71% of traditional-channel farmers get input 
credit from the input companies; apparently the latter are not more attracted to the larger more 
specialized producers in the supermarket-channel. Supermarket-channel farmers obtain twice the 
amount of credit per farm, but that is merely consonant with the greater production volume, in 
fact is less than proportionate to it. Supermarkets and the dedicated-wholesalers do not provide   12
input credit; they obviously do not need to, given the availability of credit from input companies, 
so there is little to no “market failure” for them to resolve.   
Second, 81% of supermarket-channel, and 62% of traditional-channel farmers get 
technical assistance – and nearly all of this is from input companies, at no explicit charge. The 
gap is explained by the great input use intensity and complexity employed by the supermarket-
channel producers, hence more need for advice from the vendors. Note that input suppliers 
supplant public extension services – in fact there has never been in these zones consistent 
availability of public extension for horticulture products only the odd project here and there, and 
input suppliers for decades have played the role of vendor, creditor, and advisor.  
Economic benefit analysis of the market adoption  
It is interesting that while we found that while supermarket-channel farmers earn more 
gross income per hectare (24% more, which would be accounted for merely by yield differences, 
as the price is the same between the channels), they achieve those higher yields with greater 
variable input outlays (and have 36% higher costs), hence actually earn slightly less per hectare 
than do the traditional-channel farmers. There is no statistical difference in the net income per 
hectare between the channels. However, note that in section 5 we show that the marginal value 
product of two key chemical inputs is well below the factor price, implying allocative 
inefficiency (Lau and Yotopoulos 1971) – overuse, in the economic sense – of the chemicals – 
literally “overkill.” This is a common finding by agronomists in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
horticulture areas of Central America, finding that growers overused chemicals relative to their 
agronomic payoff, or as we show here, their economic payoff. This could be due to the 
explanation so often given in the literature, that the input companies are advising them to buy 
things they do not need, and the farmers do not know the difference. Or it could be for the   13
explanation one finds in the agribusiness literature, that farmers overuse chemicals to reduce the 
downside risk. Both could be true, we did not return and explore this further, and should. It is 
clear, however, that these are all basically small farmers, and some of them depend for their 
livelihoods nearly exclusively on tomatoes, and are perhaps fearful of “getting it wrong” and so 
overreact (in an economic sense) to risk. 
As the payoff between the two channels does not differ, why do the larger, more 
capitalized, more specialized, more productive farmers bother to “go the extra mile” and sell to 
the dedicated wholesalers that serve the supermarket channel, and not just to the traditional 
brokers? We asked the farmers this in a qualitative section of the questionnaire and report main 
results in Table 9. The general implication of the responses is that dedicated wholesalers 
represent a lower risk (to sell year round and to get paid) and lower transaction cost option as 
compared with the traditional wholesalers and rural brokers. This is not then a story about the 
supermarkets per se, but about the types of wholesalers that are gravitating toward being the 
preferred intermediaries for supermarkets, and the benefits, mainly in transaction costs and risk 
reduction, that these larger wholesalers confer on farmers – as well, as we noted above, on their 
clients the supermarkets.  
5. Econometric Results 
5.1. Determinants of Market Channel Choice 
   14
Regression results for channel choice are shown in Table 6.
1 Two results stand out. First, 
as expected from the descriptive analysis, the regression results in Table 6 showed that having 
irrigation is an important driver of being in the supermarket channel.   
Second, surprisingly the other variable which was significant in the model was the 
organization level of the producer. The coefficient is negative which implies that producers who 
belong to a producer’s association or cooperative tend not to adopt the supermarket channel. The 
explanation appears to reside in the tendency for smaller, less capitalized farmers to associate, 
and get three things from the association: (1) ability to borrow equipment (such as sprayers) 
owned collectively; (2) transport through the coop truck; (3) access to inputs, as some of the 
associations buy inputs collectively, getting better prices, and then distribute them among the 
members. Moreover, our interviews with the dedicated wholesalers revealed that they prefer to 
hand-pick good producers and bulk and select themselves, rather than rely on the (from their 
perspective, imperfect) services of the small farmers own groups.  
5.2. Production function estimates: comparison between groups 
 
We expected to find differences in the production functions between producers of each 
channel, expecting producers of the supermarket channel to use a technology more intensive in 
capital versus labor or land than the traditional producers, given the quality and consistency 
requirements of the dedicated wholesalers representing the supermarkets.  
We estimated the respective production functions and show the results in Table 7, and 
compared them using a Chow test
2, and found evidence of structural differences. As expected, 
the results show the supermarket channels to be more capital-intensive.  
                                                 
1 The regressors passed (at 10% level) the Hausman exogeneity test.    15
Using the significant coefficients and predicted values, we estimated the marginal 
product values (MPV) and show them in Table 8. The MVP of land under tomatoes is less than 
the factor price of one ha of land; we compared the MVP with the rental cost (an important 
comparison) and found that the MVP of land is above the rental cost, implying a land constraint 
for this good land.  
As announced above, we found here that the MVPs of fungicides and insecticides are 
well above the factor prices, indicating that they are being overused in an allocative efficiency 
sense, for the supermarket channel, and are being underused in the traditional channel. This 
mirrors the results of Carter and Wiebe (1990) who found capital constraints among the smaller 
farmers in wheat production in Kenya employing the same methodology.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper showed that in comparison between supermarket channels (working via dedicated 
wholesalers) and traditional channels, farmers selling to supermarkets tend to be in the upper-end 
of the “small farmer” category (whereas the traditional-channel growers are in the smaller end), 
have more capital (in particular, irrigation, which allows them to supply all year and attain 
greater productivity and consistency), and be much more specialized in commercial horticulture 
in general and in tomatoes in particular, as compared to the traditional farmers. While they have 
higher yields, they also have higher input use, including use of chemicals, and these greater input 
expenditures (accompanied by more credit and technical assistance from the chemical 
companies) means that their profit rate is roughly similar to the farmers in the traditional 
channel. They tell us that they prefer still the more demanding wholesale-supermarket channel 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The Chow test works under the homoskedasticity assumption, therefore before computing the chow test, we 
performed the Bruesch Pagan and White tests for evidence of heteroskedasticity; the results showed that there was 
no evidence of heteroskedasticiy at a 10% significance level.   16
because it offers a lower risk and lower transaction cost outlet for the variety of their qualities 
and grades, all year. In turn, the supermarkets, who do not buy direct but rather source from a 
few dedicated wholesalers, rely on this year-round supply, lower transaction costs, and 
consistency. While the share of supermarkets in the produce market in Guatemala is still minor, 
these results mean merely that the more capitalized-tier of small farmers enjoy some advantages 
with the new channel, but also some entry costs that the traditional farmers as of yet do not face. 
As the supermarket channel grows, it is expected that more and more farmers will need to 
capitalized in ways that will either make them competitive in the new market, or in the 
traditional markets that will doubtless evolve to maintain competitiveness themselves. 
Development programs over the medium-long run will need to take into account the changing 
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Table 1. Comparison of Land Access Characteristics between Groups of Tomato Producers 
(grouped by channel) 







 N=164  n=112  n=52   
Access to Land (average in Ha) 
Own property (Ha)  5.9  5.4  7.0   
Obtained for usufruct (Ha)   1.0  1.4  0.1   
Rented (Ha)  1.5  2.0  0.6  A 
Sharecropped (Ha)  0.6  0.7  0.3  A 
Leased (Ha)  0.1  0.1  0.1   
Half leased (Ha)  0.1  0.1  0.2   
Total (Ha)  8.8  9.3  7.8   
Land use 
Agriculture (Ha)  3.9  4.6  2.5   a 
Livestock (Ha)  4.7  4.4  5.3   
Other (Ha)  0.3  0.4  0.0   
Agriculture (%)  44.2  48.9  32.1   
Livestock (%)  53.1  47.4  67.7   
Other (%)  2.8  3.8  0.2   
Property title 
Yes (%)  60.4  58.0  65.4   
No (%)  7.3  7.1  7.7   
No Response (%)  32.3  34.8  26.9    
Note a = statistically different at 10% significant level 
Table 2. Comparison of Technology Indicators between groups of tomato producers (grouped by 
channel) 







Irrigation technology in 2004         
Growers with irrigation (%)  65.9  80.4  34.6  a 
Growers without irrigation (%)  34.1  19.6  65.4  a 
Total (%)  100  100  100   
        
Irrigated area (avg. Ha)  3.5  4.5  1.2  a 
Irrigated area (%)  39%  49%  16%  a 
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 Table 3. Comparison of Output and Yields between Groups 
   Total  Supermarket  Traditional  Sig 
   n=164  n=112  N=52    
Farm size (Avg. Ha)  8.8  9.3  7.8   
Tomato Area (Avg. Ha)  3.4  4.2  1.7  a 
Tomato production (MT)  168.6  215.8  66.7  a 
Yield/ Ha (MT)  41.4  43.7  36.6  a 
Tomato cycles (Average)  1.6  1.79  1.19  a 
Growers that plant once a year (%)  41.5  23.2  80.8  a 
Growers that plant twice a year (%)  56.7  74.1  19.2  a 
Growers that plant three times a year (%)  1.8  2.7  0    
Note, a= significant differences at 10% level. 
Table 4. Comparison of Credit Access and Technical Assistance Between Groups of Tomato 
Producers by Channel. 
   Total  Supermarket  Traditional  Sig 
Credit Access (%) 
Yes (%)  79.3  83  71.2   
No (%)  20.7  17  28.8   
Total (%)  100  100  100   
Total Credit amount received by all sources  6,409  7,504  3,656  A 
Access to Technical Assistance 
Yes (%)  75  81.3  61.5  A 
No (%)  25  18.8  38.5  A 
Total (%)  100  100  100    
Note a = statistically different at 10% significant level   20
 
Table 5. Comparison of gross margins between groups of tomato producers by channel.  







   n=164  n=112  n=52    
Price (50 Lbs. box, in Quetzales) 
Average Price  0.29  0.29  0.29   
Maximum average price  0.57  0.57  0.57   
Minimum average price  0.09  0.11  0.09   
Standard. Deviation  0.09  0.09  0.09   
Range 0.47  0.45  0.47   
Gross Income by 1 Mz in Quetzales  11,749  12,509  10,111  A 
Total Cost (1Mz)  8,339  9,097  6,685  A 
Marketing and transportation Cost  1,573  1,834  1,010  A 
Total Input Cost  4,438  4,871  3,506  A 
Total Labor Cost  2,175  2,220  2,056  A 
Total Plowing Cost  154  173  113  A 
Net Income (1Mz)  3,409  3,412  3,426   
NET INCOME (dollars per ha)   612  613  615   
Net margin (%)  29  27.3  33.9   
Note; 1 manzana (mz)=.7 ha; a = statistically different at 10% significant level 
Table 6. Determinants of Tomato Grower adoption of the Supermarket Channel 
Variables  Coeficient   (SE)  Sign. 
Constant  -0.038 0.760    
Grower’s age (years)  -0.015 0.012    
Grower’s education (years)  -0.050 0.036    
Family size  -0.060 0.066    
Equipped with transportation means (Yes=1 No=0)  0.502 0.315    
Distance to Market (Kms)  0.000 0.001    
Association level (Associated=1, Not Assoc.=0)  -0.594 0.315  * 
Irrigation (has irrigation=1, No=0)  1.365 0.294  ** 
NFRI Ratio,  (Non-Farm Rural Income)  -0.802 0.985    
Livestock (Head)  -0.010 0.009    
Land (Farm size)  0.010 0.016    
Land2 (Farm size squared)  0.000 0.000    
Number of observations  164       
Pseudo R2  0.231       
Wald chi-squared (11)  41.46       
Notes: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%   21
 
Table 7. Cobb Douglas Production Function Estimation Results 






Constant  5.2896 0.8278  4.4444 1.3613 
Labor 0.1852  0.1178  -0.1399  0.2015 
Tomato  area  0.7689** 0.1361  0.7431** 0.2271 
Fertilizers  0.0571 0.0659  0.1159 0.1731 
Foliars -0.0354  0.0504  0.0242  0.0767 
Herbicides -0.0005  0.0066  0.0030  0.0100 
Fungicides  0.0412** 0.0184  0.3354** 0.1059 
Insecticides 0.0478**  0.0223  -0.0584  0.1058 
Land quality  -0.0032  0.0187   0.0262*  0.0156      
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.1092*  0.1498  0.0675  0.1129 
R-squared 0.9207  0.9137   
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000   
Notes: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Table 8. Marginal Value Products 
   Supermarket  Traditional 
  MPV    Factor Cost  MPV    Factor Cost 
Tomato Area (Ha) 
Fungicides (Cost) 
Insecticides 






















  Average 
Productivity 
    Average 
Productivity 
   
Labor (per day/Ha)  $29.55      $25.20     
Land (per Ha)  $14,778      $11,672     
  Sample 
Average 
    Sample 
Average 
   
Labor (days)  500      463     
Land (Ha)  1.6      1.4     
   22
 
Table 9: Qualitative Evaluations of Market Channels by the grower groups 











         n=112     n=52    
Direct to supermarket    20%    23% 
Broker at farmgate    13%  *  29% 
Wholesaler (specific to 
the grower’s 
group/stratum) 
* 65% *  42%  Ability to sell all-year to this channel 
No response    2%    6% 
a 
            
Direct to supermarket    5%    4% 
Broker at farmgate    7%  *  29% 
Wholesaler (specific to 
grower’s group) 
* 83% *  63% 
Ability to sell all qualities/grades to 
this channel 
No response    4%    4% 
a 
            
Direct to supermarket    6%    4% 
Broker at farmgate    31%  *  52% 
Wholesaler (specific to 
grower’s group) 
* 57% *  42% 
Ability to sell at low transaction cost 
and risk to this channel 
No response    5%    2% 
a 
            
Direct to supermarket    7%    4% 
Broker at farmgate    40%  *  56% 
Wholesaler (specific to 
grower’s group) 
* 52% *  33% 
Ability to be paid quickly by this 
channel 
No response     1%     8% 
a 
 
* = dedicated wholesaler for supermarket channel growers, and = traditional wholesalers and 
brokers for traditional channel growers 
 